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Crossing the line in the sand: regional officials, monopolisation of state power and 
‘rebellion’. The case of Mehmed Ağa Boyacıoğlu in Cyprus, 1685-1690 
 
Marios Hadjianastasis* 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to examine centre-periphery relations and issues of state 
control in Ottoman provinces in the seventeenth century, as these are reflected in the 
case of Mehmed Ağa Boyacıoğlu in Ottoman Cyprus. Mehmed Ağa Boyacıoğlu rose 
to prominence in the 1680s and dominated the island for a period of five to seven 
years, until 1690. His behaviour and actions, and the way the Sublime Porte dealt with 
them, represent a useful example of how power was negotiated between the centre 
and the periphery. Moreover, it demonstrates how rebellion terminology had a 
particular meaning for contemporary historians and officials, but must be used with 
caution by the analysts of today. This paper focuses on our handling of this 
phenomenon, and initiates a discussion on terminology and meaning.  
 
Keywords 
Rebellion, state control, provincial elites, Ottoman Cyprus, Mehmed Ağa Boyacıoğlu. 
 
 
“Things were in great disorder on the Isle of Cyprus, though otherwise divided into 
several Factions, all agreeing in their discontent against their Bassa, who had been 
obliged for his own security to retire into the Castle of Nicosia”.1 
 
The concept of rebellion in the Ottoman empire has become almost synonymous with 
its period of ‘decline’, and is one of the reasons put forward by the proponents of the 
decline paradigm in their search for the roots of the empire’s eventual demise. As 
historians viewed history through the tinted glass of the empire’s dissolution in the 
twentieth century, and, perhaps with a degree of regret in some cases, the forensic 
examination of the reasons for this demise began in earnest.
2
 Rebellion, 
insubordination and unrest in the provinces, alongside the corruption of the Janissary 
corps which had abandoned its non-hereditary ways, have been cited as reasons for 
decline. This was supposedly caused by the ‘weakening’ of the state and the 
‘decadence’ into which Ottoman sultans allowed themselves to fall - meaning lack of 
control over the empire. In recent years, historians have rejected the decline thesis, 
initially in favour of the milder decentralisation paradigm, which was in turn 
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reinterpreted in favour of a less rigid and suggestive approach which stresses the 
renegotiation of power between the state and provincial groups and notables. 
The term ‘rebellion’ itself, dangerously overloaded with imagery, was liberally 
applied by modern historians to characterise diverse cases ranging from garrison 
mutinies to disputes with regional officials. This paper aims to examine one such 
case, that of Mehmed Ağa Boyacıoğlu of Cyprus in the late-seventeenth century. 
Mehmed Ağa Boyacıoğlu, one of the ağas of Nicosia, managed to monopolise state 
power and authority on the island for a period of at least five years, from 1685 to 
1690.
3
 He was eventually branded a ‘bandit’ and a ‘rebel’, and caused the intervention 
of the Porte on two occasions. He was eventually captured and executed in 1690 by 
Çifutoğlu Ahmed Paşa and his troops. Historians have treated this incident as a 
rebellion, based mainly on contemporary histories and accounts. However, when 
examined closely, this case raises serious questions about our handling of terms that 
are not immediately suited to this particular incident, or indeed elsewhere where the 
terminology of rebellion is applied. Going beyond a simple acceptance of Ottoman 
terminology and monochrome perception, this paper aims to expose the complex and 
fascinating socioeconomic and political fermentations in this period of the island’s 
history and offer a different perspective in dealing with instances of breakdown of 
state control.
4
 In addition, the paper will discuss issues of negotiation of authority, 
control and legitimacy, in an attempt to offer alternatives to the rigid branding of such 
phenomena as rebellions by contemporary and modern historians alike. 
The subject of rebellion in the Ottoman empire has been dealt with extensively. 
Karen Barkey’s often-criticised work examines issues of centre and periphery, 
sultanic control and regional elites.
5
 Rifaat Abou-El-Hajj’s work on the 1703 rebellion 
deals with a rebellion at the very core of the empire,
6
 one which overthrew Sultan 
Mustafa II and put Ahmed III in his place. Virginia Aksan has worked on garrison 
rebellions and military mutinies,
7
 while Pamira Brummett has attempted to provide a 
taxonomy of Ottoman rebellions.
8
 State control and military rebellions have been the 
subject of various studies and collected volumes adopting a more comparative 
approach.
9
 
                                                          
3
 It is generally believed that Boyacıoğlu’s rule began in 1683 and ended in 1690, perhaps as a result of 
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8
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Although terms such as ‘rebellion’, ‘rebel’, ‘mutiny’ and their Ottoman equivalents 
were used liberally during the Ottoman period to characterise people or groups who 
for one reason or other fell on the wrong side of legality and power struggles, the use 
of the same terms in modern scholarship has a pre-emptive effect on the reader as to 
the ideological content of the analysis. When one thinks of rebels, the images 
conjured often include bands of roving raiders plundering villages and torturing 
hapless peasants, invading courts and palaces and overthrowing sultans, raising the 
banner of rebellion against the central authority and its agents. Indeed, as Brummett 
points out, the concepts of mutiny and rebellion became very generalised in the 
seventeenth century, and reflected more a perceived state of affairs, as seen from 
above, than an accurate depiction of the situation on the ground.
10
 Just as Na‘ima’s 
explanation of sixteenth-century rebellions was written vis-à-vis an idealised past 
where state control was thought to be at its strongest,
11
 modern historians of the 
Ottoman Empire have also projected back modern concepts of state control over 
society and explained rebellions as instances of breakdown of that control and 
indications of that retrospective (and now considered redundant) model of Ottoman 
decline.
12
 
Moreover, we must draw a line between actual military rebellions and mutinies, and 
what could be perceived as the collapse of state control in Ottoman provinces. This is 
often seen as a result of the increasing power of local notables, whose agenda may or 
may not have been in conflict with the state. The branding of such incidents as 
rebellions by contemporary sources, and their uncritical acceptance by modern 
observers, leads inevitably to their study alongside garrison mutinies and of course the 
great Celali revolts of the early seventeenth century.
13
 This approach does not allow 
for a thorough study of the local and regional socioeconomic dynamics which caused 
such incidents. The problem may be identified in Ottoman historical terminology, as 
the terms şaki/eşkiya were used to characterise anyone who found themselves outside 
the loop of sultanic legitimacy. Consequently, the terms isyan, şakavet and fitne were 
used to describe the activity of the above.  
One thing is certain: those who found themselves branded as şaki/eşkiya were not 
beyond redemption or reconciliation - their condition was not terminal. This point was 
made by Jane Hathaway, who pointed out that out-of-favour Egyptian factions, 
denounced using the terms the şaki/eşkiya, were still thought of as being within a 
framework of legitimacy. Their branding as şaki/eşkiya was by no means the point of 
no return, as their “status could be reversed without unimaginable difficulty”.14 It 
would be hard to imagine these eşkiya as the type of bandits who preyed on travellers 
and led a life of robbery and crime. Despite the use of identical terminology, 
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Hathaway, Mutiny, pp. 105-13, p. 109. 
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distinguishing between emerging notables who ‘crossed the line in the sand’, and 
soldiers who rebelled because their pay was late or the chain of supply failed them is 
essential. Add to these the presence of regional elites, competition and the occasional 
conflict which led to incidents of ‘rebellion’, and what we have is a spectrum of 
diverse cases and phenomena. The study of these provincial elites within their own 
micro-system has created a useful paradigm for the understanding of the social 
dynamic of Ottoman regions, particularly in the period of the ayan.
15
 When does a 
regional official become a rebel? What and where is the ‘line in the sand’?  
 
Seventeenth-century Cyprus 
 
In order to explain the situation in seventeenth-century Cyprus it is essential to read 
between the lines of historical narratives of the period. Essentially, this means 
attempting to understand the composition of elite groups on the island, their interests, 
the complex nature of relations between them, and their points of collaboration or 
conflict.  
Cyprus in the late seventeenth century was a place of complex social and economic 
developments. The hundred years that had passed since the conquest of 1571 
functioned as the furnace which smelted various social elements: those inherited from 
the Venetian presence and also introduced by the Ottomans. These processes resulted 
in an amalgam which was to last until at least the eighteenth century.
16
  
Orthodox Christian higher clergymen and ambitious local notables sought to settle 
into their domain as Ottoman officials, and mark their turf. In that context, conflicts 
and power struggles were not unusual at all and must not be seen as an indication of 
either disorder or abnormality. Such conflicts, whether they escalated into outbursts of 
violent confrontation or fizzled out with the exchange of accusations and slander in 
the eyes of central authority, have to be considered to be an integral part of relations 
amongst power groups at that time.  
Cyprus in the period between 1670 and 1687 was under the bureau (kalem) of the 
kapudan paşa,17 who in turn appointed a governor or mütesellim whose main duty 
was to ensure the collection and payment of taxes. The mütesellim arrived on the 
island armed with imperial orders and interacted with local officials in order to 
achieve maximum profit with minimum effort. At this point in the procedure 
pragmatism took over, and the mütesellim had to negotiate with local groups and 
people with influence if successful tax collection were to take place. It is in this period 
that the role of the Orthodox Christian higher clergy in tax collection becomes visible, 
and it continued to increase from that point onwards. With an already established 
network of communications and, more crucially, control, the Orthodox ecclesiastical 
structure became an invaluable asset for Ottoman administration.
18
 Its network of 
                                                          
15
 See Antonis Anastasopoulos (ed.), Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire (Rethymno: Crete 
University Press, 2005). 
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 Given, Michael and Hadjianastasis, Marios, “Landholding and landscape in Ottoman Cyprus”, in 
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and Economy on an Ottoman Island: Cyprus in the Eighteenth Century”, Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, SOAS, 2011, pp. 122-37; Alasya, Halil Fikret, Kıbrıs Tarihi, M.E. 1450-M.S. 1878 ve 
Belli Başlı Antikiteleri (Nicosia: Ahmet Mithat Akpınar, 1939), p. 69. 
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the collection of the bedel-i nüzül tax in 21 Safer 1088 (25 April 1677); Kuzey Kıbrıs Milli Arşiv, 
Lefkoşa Sicil Defteri, n. 5, p. 32, entry 1.  
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bishops and priests was undoubtedly a powerful tool for administration, one utilised 
by the Ottomans in a pragmatic realisation of mutual interest.
19
 
The relatively loose grip central administration had on the control of Cyprus 
facilitated the emergence of local notables, but also contributed to the expansion of 
powers of local officials such as the kadı and the ağa of the Janissaries. European 
trade opportunities, especially the export of raw silk and cotton, drew local notables, 
clergymen and military men, who acquired land and expanded their holdings with a 
view to satisfying increasing demand for fabrics as well as for the raw materials. This 
led to the emergence of powerful figures, both Ottoman officials who used their 
influence to further their economic interests and also merchants who used their 
existing wealth to further their political influence and acquire posts in the local 
administration. 
This two-way process of ‘Ottomanization’, the incorporation of local elites into the 
Ottoman structure but also the ‘naturalisation’ of Ottoman officials into local life, was 
most certainly observed in Cyprus.
20
 Local social and political fermentations were 
facilitated further by the island’s ‘comfortable’ distance from the empire’s 
administrative centre. As an Ottoman province, Cyprus served primarily as a place of 
exile for undesirables. The centre’s main concern was the fiscal viability of the 
province, whose geographical position and productivity made it simultaneously of 
average importance (at best) in the eyes of the centre but extremely important for 
local entrepreneurs. In fact, the island’s often exaggerated strategic importance for the 
Ottomans lay more in the fact that it was not held by Venice rather than in its 
inclusion in the Sultan’s Protected Domains.21  
Incorporation of local notables in the administration was widely practised 
throughout the Ottoman empire, and was invaluable to the central government, as it 
allowed it to achieve adequate and effective administration of its provinces without 
necessarily having to go to great lengths. Faroqhi stresses the importance of rural 
notables as people who “did not necessarily fit into the simple dichotomy of 
privileged state servitors and ordinary taxpayers […]. Yet the Empire could not 
possibly be governed without them”.22  
Barkey states that these local groups were separately dependent on the state, which 
was “segmenting elites and common people”, forcing them to interact directly with 
the state but preventing them from interacting with each other. As far as Cyprus was 
concerned, this was simply not the case. The various elite groups were firmly 
intertwined with one another to such an extent that it is often difficult for the historian 
to distinguish the boundaries between groups and their interests. A glimpse into the 
                                                          
19
 Hadjianastasis, Marios, “Bishops, Ağas and Dragomans: a Social and Economic History of Ottoman 
Cyprus, 1640-1704”, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Birmingham, 2004, pp. 100-40. 
20
 On provincial elites and ‘ottomanization’, see Canbakal, Hülya, Society and Politics in an Ottoman 
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Society in the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Bierman, Irene A., 
"The Ottomanization of Crete", in The Ottoman City and Its Parts: Urban Structure and Social Order, 
Irene A. Bierman, Rifa’at A. Abou-El-Haj and Donald Preziosi (eds),  (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide 
D. Caratzas 1991), pp. 53-75, and Toledano, Ehud R., "The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-
1900): A Framework for Research", in Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within, Ilan 
Pappé and Moshe Ma’oz (eds), (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), pp. 145-162. 
21
 For a discussion of Cyprus’ ‘strategic position’, see Hadjikyriacou, “Society and Economy on an 
Ottoman Island”, pp. 73-97. 
22
 Faroqhi, Suraiya, “Coping with the central state, coping with local power: Ottoman regions and 
notables from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century”, in The Ottomans and the Balkans: a 
discussion of historiography, ed. Fikret Adanir and Suraiya Faroqhi (Leiden: Brill,  2002), pp. 351-82, 
352. 
6 
 
Venetian archives reveals a network of personal relationships which is often lost in 
official Ottoman documentation.
23
 Interactions between groups of interest and 
individuals were based on relationships built within administrative, professional, 
personal and family networks, all of which contributed to an intricate pattern.  In 
addition, it is impossible to suggest a consistent model of collaboration or conflict 
among elite groups such as the Christian clergy, the military, local landowners and 
foreign merchants, as these relied heavily on personal activity rather than pre-defined 
patterns of behaviour prescribed by the concepts of institutions and organised groups. 
Barkey’s idea of the state as omnipresent and in control of various facets of regional 
politics is overly idealistic; as we shall see below, the image of rigid interest groups 
which existed beyond individuals is simply not accurate. Interest groups and 
immediately identifiable social groups did not necessarily coincide. 
However, Barkey is right in claiming that these regional elites did not rebel against 
the state, but rather agitated to be allowed to be a part of it. In Cyprus, power 
struggles and conflicts among local notables occurred in an attempt to gain a larger 
share, or even a local monopoly, of sultanic power on the island, rather than to oppose 
or overthrow it. These people were aiming to achieve the most they could feasibly 
attain within the system; they had no interest in opposing it. The Boyacıoğlu incident 
is emblematic of these processes. 
 
The background to the Boyacıoğlu events 
 
The period preceding Boyacıoğlu’s emergence was dominated by unrest in the 
Janissary garrison and agitation which seems to have been caused by a variety, and 
often a combination, of factors. Taxation, collection and payments to local garrisons 
were a frequent cause for unrest. İbrahim Paşa, the island’s mütesellim, was removed 
and executed in 1665, after a petition to the Porte. His successor, Derzi İbrahim Paşa, 
was also the target of a new complaint, but an investigation cleared him while it 
forced the islanders to pay the sum of 36,000 guruş.24 
Local garrisons often protested about delayed payments, and complaints by tax 
collectors claimed that they interfered with tax collection and prevented tax collectors 
from carrying out their duties. According to a petition by the Janissary leadership in 
1675, the Janissaries of the island made excessive demands and oppressed their 
superiors.
25
 In the same year, the Janissary leadership (yeniçeri ocağın ihtiyarları) 
petitioned against the beylerbeyi of Cyprus, Abdülkadir Paşa, claiming that he took 
some money from them in excess, without any legal claim or justification.
26
 The ağa 
of the Janissaries, Ahmed Ağa, was also the target of a personal complaint by a 
person called Ahmed, who claimed that the ağa owed him 2,200 guruş from the 
                                                          
23
 The documents of the Archivio di Stato in Venice and the archives of the French consulate in Cyprus 
are explicit in the description of personal and professional relationships between European merchants 
and members of the Cypriot religious and administrative elite, Migliardi O'Riordan, Giustiniana (ed.), 
Archivio del consolato veneto a Cipro (fine sec. XVII - inizio XIX) (Venice: Archivio di Stato, 1993); 
Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, Anna, Consulat de France à Larnaca 1660-1696 (tome I) documents 
inédits pour servir à l’histoire de Chypre (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1991). 
24
 Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, vol. VI (Graz: Akademische 
Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1963), p. 152. 
25
 Majer, Hans Georg, Das Osmanische "registerbuch der beschwerden" (şikayet defteri) vom 
jahre 1675: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. mixt. 683 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1984), 3b (1). 
26
 Majer, Registerbuch, 3b (2). 
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avariz money, which he refused to pay back.
27
 In 1676, the local ağas obstructed the 
collection of the cizye, forcing the collector to petition the Porte.
28
 Further problems 
arose in the following year: the collector of the bedel-i nüzül for 1088/1677-78 
petitioned the Porte, complaining that the local ağas of the Janissaries obstructed him 
in his collection of the tax.
29
 In Muharrem 1090 (March of 1679) the Janissaries of the 
island obstructed the collection of the bedel-i nüzül tax by appropriating excessive 
amounts for their salaries. After a petition to the Porte by the local kadıs, the 
Janissaries were ordered to stop interfering. The local kadı was ordered to report any 
further interference.
30
 
The frequency with which the island’s Janissaries became embroiled in disputes, 
with a particular focus on tax collection and salary payments, points to the existence 
of a culture of interference and dependence on tax revenues beyond that ascribed by 
regulations. It may also point to an ongoing unresolved conflict within the 
administration of the island’s revenues, which created grievances and led to petitions 
and complaints. 
Taxation-related unrest inevitably involved the island’s dragomans, who also 
performed fiscal functions. This period was marked by the emergence of powerful 
dragomans, such as Markos Koromilos, better known as Markoullis.
31
 Markoullis was 
only one of a long list of entrepreneurial Cypriots who combined official roles with 
economic activity in an attempt to accumulate wealth and power. His activity was 
immortalised in the ‘Song of the Dragomans’, which recounts his rise, fall from grace 
and eventual replacement by Dragoman Georgis (or Yorkis).
32
  
Markoullis emerged on the scene in the 1660s as a man engaged in trade and in 
contact with European merchants. He often took loans and bought fabrics on credit 
from Venetian or French merchants.
33
 He was appointed to the post of sarraf
34
 by his 
patron, Dragoman ‘Miser Antzulos’. After accusations of embezzlement he was called 
to Istanbul where he was imprisoned. Through the influence of his friends and in 
particular the dragoman of the imperial fleet, Panayiotis Nikousios,
35
 he was released 
and went to Crete to meet the grand vezir Fazil Ahmed Köprülü, at the time engaged 
in the Cretan War. After Markoullis promised to repay the sums owed, offering 
fabrics as gifts,
36
 the grand vezir appointed him dragoman of Cyprus. When he 
returned to Cyprus he reportedly began to oppress the populace, exacting excessive 
amounts in taxes and registering children and old men as tax-payers. He clashed with 
Archbishop Nikiforos, who sent a petition to the Porte asking for his removal. A 
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 Majer, Registerbuch, 38b (7). 
28
 Kuzey Kıbrıs Milli Arşiv, Lefkoşa Sicil Defteri, n. 5, p. 76, entry 3. 
29
 Kuzey Kıbrıs Milli Arşiv, Lefkoşa Sicil Defteri, n. 5, p. 83, entry 1. 
30
 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Mühimme Defteri, no. 96, p. 181 (20-30 Muharrem 1090/2-11 March 
1679) 
31
 Sometimes also referred to as Okromilos, see Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, Consulat, pp. 37-9, 78-81. 
32
 Papadopoullos, Theodoros (Theodore), “Το Άσμα των Διερμηνέων” [The Song of the Dragomans], 
Κυπριακαί Σπουδαί, ME’ [45] (1981), 55-141. 
33
 Kuzey Kıbrıs Milli Arşiv, Lefkoşa Sicil Defteri, n. 5, p. 26, entry 2. This was a repayment of 
Markoullis’s debt to Sauveur Marin, after the former’s death in 1675. 
34
 For the role of sarraf see Saeed, Abdullah, "Ṣarrāf (a.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, 
Brill, 2011.Brill Online, [http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-8886], accessed 
11 March 2011. 
35
 Nikousios was a powerful and influential figure, see Detorakis, Theocharis, “Η Τουρκοκρατία στην 
Κρήτη (1669-1898) [Turkish rule in Crete (1669-1898), in Κρήτη: Ιστορία και πoλιτισμός [Crete: 
History and Culture], vol. II, ed. Nikolaos M. Panagiotakis (Iraklion: Syndesmos Topikon Enoseon 
Dimon & Koinotiton Kritis, 1988), pp. 335-436. 
36
 The presence of fabrics further denotes his activity in this trade. 
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Cypriot merchant called Georgis, from the village of Lefkara, was preferred for 
dragoman, although Markoullis resisted his replacement bitterly with the two coming 
to blows in the house of Mehmed Ağa.37 The two disputing dragomans went to 
Poland, where the army was campaigning, in order to resolve this issue with the 
Grand Vezir. Markoullis was finally sidelined and found himself exiled to the fortress 
of Famagusta,
38
 where he was assassinated by the Janissaries soon after.
39
 
 
The Boyacıoğlu incident 
 
Mehmed Ağa Boyacıoğlu emerged in the early 1680s as a local ağa. He rose to 
prominence and became embroiled in power struggles with the other ağas of the 
island, which he managed to overpower. He became a de facto ruler of the island, 
controlling administration and taxation. He resisted a first attempt to bring him in line, 
in 1685/86, and he soon abused his powers, in his dealings with the French merchant 
community. By 1688/89 he was branded a şaki, and more decisive action was taken 
against him by the imperial centre. An armed conflict and a long pursuit ended in his 
capture and execution in 1690.  
The most detailed account we have of the incident is the one recorded by 
Archimandrite Kyprianos in his history of Cyprus.
40
 Kyprianos, writing almost a 
century after the events, had obtained his information from the French Consul Benoît 
Astier
41
 who had recorded it from two elderly Cypriots in 1764: a Muslim man 97 
years of age and a Christian of a similar age who claimed to have been eye witnesses 
of the events.
42
 It is difficult to pinpoint exactly Mehmed Ağa Boyacıoğlu’s origins. 
Kyprianos, a clergyman-cum-historian who published his Ιστορία Χρονολογική in 
1788, traces Boyacıoğlu’s emergence in the period after the island was included in the 
kapudan paşa’s bureau circa 1670. According to Kyprianos, after the administrative 
change of 1670, the island’s local ağas became increasingly involved in the 
administration and tax collection in particular. 
This being the situation, the ağas of the land, becoming more powerful because 
of wealth, honour and supporters in the capital, they attempted to obtain and 
received the supervision of these revenues either from the kapudan paşa, or even 
from Constantinople itself, and they either farmed them out or collected them in 
collaboration, they appeared as the rulers and masters of the island themselves.
43
  
                                                          
37
 Possibly Boyacıoğlu. 
38
 Papadopoullos, “Άσμα”, 55-141. 
39
 The report of the French consul Balthazar Sauvan leaves no margin for doubt concerning 
Markoullis’s death: “il fut assassiné par les genissaires de l’isle”, Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, Consulat, 
p. 115. 
40
 Kyprianos, Ιστορία, p. 310. 
41
 André-Benoît Astier was born in Aix-en-Provence in 1719 and served in Cyprus as consul of France 
from 1755 until his death in 1803. His wife was the widow of Consul Giovanni Carmogliese of Ragusa, 
see Anne Mézin, Les consuls de France au siècle des lumières (1715-1792) (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1997), p. 107. 
42
 Kyprianos, Ιστορία, p. 310. It would perhaps be prudent to express some reservation as to the validity 
of Astier’s sources, as the motif of very old men, eye witnesses lending credibility to a recorded story, 
is far from uncommon. 
43
 “Ούτως εχόντων των πραγμάτων, οι αγάδες του τόπου ενδυναμωθέντες, και από πλούτον και από 
τιμήν, και από υπερασπιστάς εις Βασιλεύουσαν, επροσπάθουν και ελάμβανον την επιστασίαν αυτήν 
των εισοδημάτων ή από τον Καπετάν Πασάν, είτε και από Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, και ή επάκτωναν 
αυτά, ή και τα εσύναζαν επιτροπικώς, εφαίνοντο ως εξουσιασταί τότε της Νήσου και Αυθένται οι 
αυτοί”, Kyprianos, Ιστορία, p. 309. 
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The statement that the island’s ağas “appeared as the rulers and masters of the island” 
suggests that the Cypriot elite had begun to gain in power. Although Kyprianos’s 
wording perhaps shows his disapproval, this may be interpreted as a mutually 
beneficial arrangement between the central authority and the province. Hindsight 
allowed Kyprianos to castigate the emergence of the ağas, but one wonders whether 
this arrangement came into existence as a result of convenience rather than weakness 
on the part of the state. Kyprianos leaves no doubt as to the ‘outcome’ of this 
arrangement. According to his History, the island’s ağas subsequently became 
“embroiled in rivalry and enmity with each other” (ήλθον εις αντιζηλίαν προς 
αλλήλους και έχθρας) and “armed themselves and clashed” (αρματώθησαν εν τω 
αναμεταξύ των και συνελαύνοντο) in a struggle for power in which Boyacıoğlu, after 
a stint in prison in Famagusta in 1683,
44
 prevailed and went on to ‘rule’ the island for 
a period of between five and seven years, until 1690. Boyacıoğlu appointed his own 
people to all the kazas who “governed, judged and supervised”.45  
Here Kyprianos makes a statement which appears contradictory and perhaps 
suggestive of pre-existing conditions: during his seven-year rule, Boyacıoğlu carried 
on paying the cizye tax annually to the cizyedar appointed by the Porte.
46
 Kyprianos 
states that “in the past, those appointed asked for this tax and kept it for 
themselves”.47 Does Kyprianos suggest that during Boyacıoğlu’s time in power the 
taxes were paid more efficiently than before, or that there was more corruption 
before? We do know from the documentation that there was a certain degree of 
agitation in the local garrison regarding salary payments and tax collection. 
Unfortunately, Kyprianos failed to expand on this, and we must be careful not to 
attribute more importance to his choice of words than may be appropriate.  
In terms of Boyacıoğlu’s origins, Kyprianos is the only historian who makes 
mention of the emergence of Boyacıoğlu and the ağas’ power struggle. Defterdar Sarı 
Mehmed Paşa48 describes events leading up to 1102/1690/91, giving an account of 
events from the beginning of Boyacıoğlu’s rebellion. His supporters came from the 
whole prism of the Cypriot military elite: janissaries, zaims and sipahis.
49
 This group 
overpowered and killed many officials who opposed them (ağas and alaybeys) and 
drove away the appointed tax collectors, the mütesellims (“birkaç ağaların ve alay 
beyilerin katl ve mütesellimlerin kaçırup”).50  
When ‘news’ of Boyacıoğlu’s activity reached the Porte, Çolak Mehmed Paşa was 
dispatched with troops to restore order. Kyprianos and Raşid agree that Çolak 
Mehmed Paşa was overpowered after only a few months on the island, and found 
                                                          
44
 “se truvant pour lors prizonnier a Famagouste”, Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, Consulat, pp. 156-8. 
45
 “οίτινες εδιοικούσον, έκρινον και επιστάτευον”, Kyprianos, Ιστορία, p. 310. 
46
 Kyprianos makes reference to the haraç (χαράτσιον), a word widely used to describe the cizye. 
47
 “δίδωντας τον καθέκαστον χρόνον, του απεσταλμένου από την Πόρταν χαρατζή το διατεταγμένον 
χαράτζιον, του οποίου πρότερον εσυνήθιζαν να είναι ζητηταί, οι απεσταλμένοι εκείνοι, και το 
εβάσταζαν δια λόγου τους”, Kyprianos, Ιστορία, p. 310.   
48
 Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekayiât, ed Abdülkadir Özcan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basımevi, 1995). On Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa see Kafadar, Cemal, Hakan Karateke and Cornell 
Fleischer, “Mehmed Paşa” in Historians of the Ottoman Empire, [online resource, 2008 
http://www.ottomanhistorians.com/database/html/defterdarmehmed_en.html] accessed on 15 June 
2011. 
49
 “cezire-i Kıbrıs’in yerlü yeniçerileri fırkalarından ve zu’ama ve erbab-ı timarından ba’z-i şakiler”, 
Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde, p. 390. 
50
 Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde, p. 391. A third historian, Mehmed Raşid, only deals with 
events after Boyacıoğlu was declared an apostate and action was taken against him, Mehmed Raşid, 
Tarih-i Raşid, vol. I (Istanbul: İbrahim Müteferrika, A.H. 1153), pp. 159b-160a. 
10 
 
himself restricted to the Kubatoğlu çiftlik.51 However, Sarı Mehmed Paşa claims that 
it was in fact a certain ‘Frenk’ Mehmed Bey52 who was sent to the island, where he 
killed many of the rebels and severely reproached the notables (ayan) for their 
support. Soon after, however, Mehmed Bey was killed in 1097/1685/86 and once 
again the rebels gained control over the island, causing a delegation of ulema to go to 
Istanbul and protest at the Porte. In all three histories the first attempt to restore order 
is reported to have failed, prompting the dispatch of new troops to the island.  
Çifutoğlu Ahmed Paşa53 was ordered to the island to eliminate the rebels.54 He 
disembarked in Akanthou, on the island’s northern coast, and headed straight to 
Kythrea
55
  where he seized the flour mills in order to cut off the supplies to the rebels 
who were barricaded in Nicosia. He stayed there for two months, ensuring that the 
rebels did not have any access to supplies from outside the walls of the city. The city 
was without bread when Ahmed Paşa, who was in the meantime joined by Çolak 
Mehmed Paşa, promised Boyacıoğlu safe passage. Boyacıoğlu left the city with his 
supporters at night, going first to Lefkara, and from there to Lefka, where 28 of his 
men were killed and another 32 captured by Ahmed Paşa’s kâhya (Κεχαγιάς).56 From 
Lefka he went to Kykkos, where he was able to regroup and fend off the pursuing 
troops. He continued to Pafos and afterwards to Kyrenia, where he caught and hanged 
a spy of the Paşa from a tree opposite the castle. With the Paşa relentlessly pursuing 
him, he attempted to enter Famagusta, hoping to barricade himself within the walls.
57
 
The gates there were already sealed and his troops were scattered by the Paşa. 
Boyacıoğlu and six other men went to Pyla and Larnaca, and while trying to get to 
Limassol, were captured in Koilani. The Paşa brought them to Nicosia where, 
according to Kyprianos, he hanged Boyacıoğlu at night. His body was on display the 
following day, when the rest of his companions were “hanged alive from hooks 
through their jaws” (εκρεμάζοντο ζώντες, επι των γάντζων από των ανθερεώνων).  
It may be useful to explore the possibility of symbolism in the methods of 
execution, and what these acts of punishment reveal not only as the messages 
intended for any current or potential rebels, but also in terms of the 'hierarchy' of 
executed rebels. Boyacıoğlu’s hanging by night may point to a need to dispose of him 
before his companions managed to rally support. In addition, the fact that he was 
hanged rather than tortured with his companions may indicate a certain respect for his 
status, which his ganched comrades were not deemed to deserve. Their painful end 
                                                          
51
 The Kubatoğlu name appears again in the eighteenth century, when we have reference to “Alay bey 
Mustafa Kubatoğlu” as responsible for collecting the fine from the Muslims of Cyprus after the Cil 
Osman incidents of 1764, Kyprianos, Ιστορία, p. 321. 
52
 He was perhaps a renegade.  
53
 Referred to as Halebli Ahmed Paşa by Raşid, Tarih, 159b-160a; Sarı Mehmed Paşa refers to Ahmed 
Paşa as “muhassil of Aydın and Saruhan, Halebli Ahmed Paşa, also known as Cühudoğlu”, Zübde, p. 
391. 
54
 He was also ordered to send the former beylerbeyi of Cyprus Mehmed Paşa as a prisoner to the Porte, 
after he was imprisoned and his property confiscated for debts to the Treasury; Şakar, Muzaffer Fehmi,  
1101/1102 (1690/1691) Tarihli 100 Numarali Mühimme Defteri (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi 
Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2007), p. 127, order no. 259 (no date-presumably Muharrem 
1102/October/November 1690). 
55
 Known as Değirmenlik in Turkish.  
56
 Kyprianos, Ιστορία, p. 311. 
57
 The alay bey of Famagusta, Hasan, was accused of assisting the ‘bandits’ and was ordered to be 
expelled from the island, should the accusations prove true; Şakar, 100 Numarali Mühimme Defteri, p. 
66, order no. 242 (10-19 Muharrem 1102/13-22 October 1690). 
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also suggests that Ahmed Paşa wanted to send a clear message to any supporters they 
might have had.
58
  
With this bloody conclusion, the Boyacıoğlu incident came to an end59, but it was 
not the end of turmoil by any stretch of the imagination. Ahmed Paşa, named 
beylerbeyi of Cyprus, was soon accused of serious transgressions, namely killing 
innocent people who had little to do with Boyacıoğlu and seizing their property, 
forcibly collecting eight to nine guruş per person for the cizye, and imposing many 
fines despite orders against such actions. In January of 1691, an order was issued for 
the appointment of a kapıcıbaşı as investigator who was ordered to examine the 
situation and report to the Porte.
60
 The process resulted in the conviction and 
execution of Ahmed Paşa, which Sarı Mehmed Paşa attributed to “the island’s climate 
and the will of God, which makes villainy part of the disposition of the island’s 
inhabitants”.61 
So who was Mehmed Boyacıoğlu? What was he? Kyprianos calls him an 
“apostate” (αποστάτης) who “shed the veil of submission” (έρριψε το κάλυμμα της 
υποταγής).62 From other sources we find out more information about him. He was a 
typical Ottoman official of Cyprus, just like Markoullis, in that his activities went 
beyond his official capacity. These include extensive trade and financial transactions 
with the foreign merchants of Larnaca and show him to be engaged in business with 
the French community there. 
Sauveur Marin, a French merchant who also had dealings with Markoullis, had lent 
Boyacıoğlu money.63 In 1687, Marin wrote to Balthazar Sauvan, the consul on the 
island, claiming that some armed Janissaries from Boyacıoğlu’s group had entered 
Marin’s house and threatened him, demanding that he hand over a tezkere and a 
hüccet which had been drawn up in 1684, and which concerned the amount of 1,060 
guruş which Boyacıoğlu’s wife and mother-in-law owed Marin.64 After a series of 
threats, the French community saw to it that Marin gave the documents to Boyacıoğlu 
                                                          
58
 However, we must be very careful with any further conclusions, as Kyprianos’s account may simply 
reflect a perception and a degree of sensationalisation, rather than fact. On the method of execution, 
Sandys describes ganching as “to be let fall from on high upon hooks, and there to hang until they die 
by the anguish of these wounds or more miserable famine”, Sandys, George, Sandys Travels: 
Containing an History of the Original and Present State of the Turkish Empire (London: John Williams 
Junior, 1673), p. 49. On capital punishment see Heyd, Uriel, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, ed. 
V.L. Menage (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) and Bosworth, C.E., I.R. Netton, I.R., F.E.Vogel, F.E., 
"Siyasa", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman (Brill, 2010) (Brill Online, 
University of Birmingham, 05 March 2010).  
59
 Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde, pp. 391-2; Kyprianos, Ιστορία, pp. 310-11. It must be pointed 
out that Boyacıoğlu’s flight through all the locations Kyprianos mentions (see Fig. 1) and his eventual 
capture in Koilani, a place which may inform Sarı Mehmed’s description of a “bir teng ve dik 
mahalde” (a narrow and steep place), would have taken weeks of pursuit, something which may well 
have brought considerable turmoil to those communities forced to accommodate Mehmed Ağa and his 
following. 
60
 Şakar, 100 Numarali Mühimme Defteri , p.244-5, order no. 509 (1-9 Cemaziyelahir 1102/1-9 March 
1691).  
61
 “cezîre-i mezbûrenin âb u havâsı iktizâsiyle emr-i Hakk ile ahâlîsinin cibilliyetlerinde merkûz olan 
şakāvet”, Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde, p. 392. 
62
 Kyprianos, Ιστορία, p. 310. Kyprianos’s word of choice may derive from his own religious office, or 
may denote that loyalty to the sultan was non-negotiable, akin to religious affiliation. 
63
 On Sauveur Marin see Laurent d’Arvieux, Mémoires du chevalier d'Arvieux, vol. V (Paris: C. J. B. 
Delespine, 1735), pp. 485-8. 
64
 The debt had been owed to Marin by the late Mehmed Ağa ‘Ermenoulou’, Boyacıoğlu’s father-in-
law, Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, Consulat, pp. 156-8.  
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out of fear that he would carry out his threats.
65
 The consul protested on the matter to 
Pierre Girardin, ambassador of France to the Porte, who petitioned the Porte and in 
June 1688 obtained an order to Boyacıoğlu to pay Marin the owed amount of 1,060 
guruş.66 On 1 December 1688, a French deputy of la nation française, Louis Martin, 
visited Marin’s house and described how Boyacıoğlu had attacked it at ten o’clock the 
previous night, searching for Marin in order to kill him, as he had not received some 
fabrics he had demanded as a present.
67
  
In addition to Boyacıoğlu’s business interests with the French, Kyprianos insinuates 
a romantic involvement with a lady from the French ‘SA’ household,68 where 
Boyacıoğlu spent some time as a ‘guest’. French reports indicate that he forced 
himself on his hosts (“s’est logé par force chez le Sieur de St Amand”).69 This was the 
house of Saint-Amand, another member of the French community, and it was there 
that a strange encounter, as described in detail by Ariel Salzmann, took place. The 
incident involved Boyacıoğlu, Sauvan and Fra Alfonso Moscati of Malta, a renegade 
pilgrim who had been wandering the area in search of salvation. Alfonso threw 
himself at Boyacıoğlu’s feet, wanting to become Muslim once again, and “hoisted his 
habit to display his circumcision”.70 Boyacıoğlu overlooked the matter, as he was 
more concerned with bringing the French community to accept his terms. This 
incident happened in March 1690, not long before Boyacıoğlu’s demise. In July 1690, 
it was reported that “the new Paşa of the island71 pursued the rebels and killed 200 of 
them”.72  
It is important to distinguish fact from myth here. As one would expect, the 
Ottoman historians and archival sources
73
 characterised Boyacıoğlu as a bandit (şaki) 
and a rebel, and the whole incident as a rebellion (fitne),
 74
 sedition (fesad) and 
villainy (şakavet).75 These expressions are common in Ottoman historical writing (and 
imperial terminology) and must be approached with caution. As Piterberg has 
observed, these terms were applied retrospectively. Just as Abaza Mehmed Paşa was 
retrospectively branded an asi (rebel), so has Boyacıoğlu been branded a villain and 
bandit by Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa and Mehmed Raşid in their renditions of the 
story.
76
 Kyprianos makes the contradictory statement that Boyacıoğlu “shed the veil 
of submission”, while continuing tax payments to imperial tax collectors. However, in 
his choice of words, Kyprianos makes a clear distinction between the nature of the 
Boyacıoğlu incident and Halil Ağa’s rebellion in 1765, an event about which he most 
                                                          
65
 Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, Consulat, pp. 139-42. 
66
 Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, Consulat,  pp. 152-4; for more information on Pierre Girardin see Comte 
de Saint-Priest (François-Emmanuel Guignard), Mémoires sur l'ambassade de France en Turquie et 
sur le commerce des Français dans le Levant (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1877). 
67
 Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, Consulat, pp. 159-62. 
68
 Written in Latin characters in the Greek text, Ιστορία, p. 311. Kyprianos or his informer probably 
kept the full name to themselves in order to protect the family’s honour. 
69
 Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, Consulat, p. 140. 
70
 Salzmann, Ariel, "A Travelogue Manqué? The Accidental Itinerary of a Maltese Priest in the 
Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean" in A Faithful Sea, The Religious Culture of the Mediteranean, 
1200-1700, Adnan A. Husain and K. E. Fleming (eds) (London: One World, 2007), pp. 141-72 
71
 Ahmed Paşa. 
72
 Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, Consulat, pp. 168-9. 
73
 “Bundan akdem Kıbrıs cezîresinde fesâd u şekâvetiyle meşhûr olan Boyacıoglı nâm şakî”, Şakar, 
100 Numarali Mühimme Defteri , p. 244-5, order no. 509 (1-9 Cemaziyelahir 1102/1-9 March 1691). 
74
 Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde, p. 390. 
75
 Raşid, Tarih, p. 159b. 
76
 Piterberg, Gabriel, “The alleged rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Paşa: historiography and the Ottoman 
state in the seventeenth century”, in Hathaway, Mutiny, pp. 14-24, 16. 
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likely had more direct information.
77
 Whereas Boyacıoğlu merely attempted to extend 
his powers and monopolise state authority on the island, Halil Ağa openly led a 
rebellion against the state and its local representatives. Kyprianos repeatedly uses the 
term zorba (ζορπάς, rebel) to describe Halil Ağa, which may indicate that he 
perceived it to convey exactly that: the open rebellion against sultanic authority, 
something which Boyacıoğlu never demonstrated. 
It is clear that the use of the term ‘rebellion’ can only serve to disguise the social 
and political conditions of the period. Boyacıoğlu emerged from the same conditions 
which produced Markoullis, and in many ways the two individuals’ activities follow 
the same pattern of networking, wealth, power and abuse thereof. When did Mehmed 
Ağa become Mehmed şaki? How did the process of transformation work and at what 
exact point in his trajectory, if ever, was he beyond any hope of legitimisation? 
‘Rebellion’ implies dissent, such as may be expressed as a result of grievance – much 
like a Janissary rebellion caused by delayed payments or debased coinage. As such, 
from the vantage point of the rebels, it was a measure of last resort to force the 
Ottoman state to engage in a dialogue with them – and a huge gamble. It is a loaded 
term which is not useful in explaining a historical process which lasted a minimum of 
five years, during which Boyacıoğlu was still integrated, albeit sporadically, into the 
state mechanism.  
Boyacıoğlu’s integration in the system is further compounded by studying the 
details of the action against him. The two military attempts at suppressing him and his 
supporters – who were by no means a bunch of roving bandits raiding villages – were 
undertaken within a space of five years. The first attempt, that of Çolak Mehmed 
Paşa, took place in 1685/86, while we know that Çifutoğlu Ahmed Paşa killed 
Boyacıoğlu and his men in 1690. This delay in decisive action betrays a number of 
things: apart from the occasional harassment of members of the French community, 
there was little else of which Boyacıoğlu could be accused. Oppression of the 
populace, over-taxation and rapacity were all accusations liberally levelled at officials 
by their rivals or other social groups whose interests they threatened. Yet these 
accusations were never levelled at Boyacıoğlu. The terms zülm u ta’addi (oppression 
and transgression) are not mentioned in any of the texts or state correspondence. 
There is little evidence so far to suggest that his activity had a measurable impact on 
the peasantry.
78
 This is not to suggest that the latter were undisturbed, but rather to 
point out that all indications point towards the continuation of normal everyday life. 
If Kyprianos’s account is to be trusted, we must assume that during this five-year 
rule Boyacıoğlu collected and paid taxes to tax collectors and appointed his men to 
“rule, judge and supervise” all over the island. The fact that an imperial order was 
sent to Boyacıoğlu in 1688, ordering him to honour his debt to Sauveur Marin, shows 
that Boyacıoğlu was still considered to be within a legal framework which allowed 
the central authority to expect him to comply with such an order. Had Boyacıoğlu 
been a true rebel treading outside legal boundaries, there would have been no point in 
attempting to make him conform to the law. Although it had been established that his 
activity did not exactly fit within the ‘ideal’ for the administration of the island, it was 
                                                          
77
 Kyprianos, Ιστορία, pp. 320-4; Hill, George, A History of Cyprus, Vol. IV, The Ottoman Province, 
the British Colony, 1571-1948, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp. 80-7. Halil Ağa’s 
rebellion came as a reaction to the imposition of fines, a result of the 1764 disturbances which resulted 
in the death of the muhassil, Cil Osman, see Kitromilides, Paschalis, “Repression and protest in 
traditional society: Cyprus 1764”, Kypriakai Spoudai, 46 (1982), 91-101, cited in Hadjikyriacou, 
“Society and Economy on an Ottoman Island”, pp. 24, 144-7 
78
 Stavridis also makes this point, “Αποστασία”, p. 143. 
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somehow de facto accepted up to the point where he was indeed declared a bandit. It 
must also be pointed out, however, that this period coincided with a Janissary revolt 
and the deposition of Mehmed IV
79
, something which undoubtedly restricted the 
Porte’s attention to more pressing matters than the annoying, if persistent, presence of 
an over-ambitious official in Cyprus. 
It seems that the point at which Boyacıoğlu and his men crossed the line in the sand 
appeared as a result of the protracted pressure he exerted on the French community, 
and their frequent reports to the ambassador in Istanbul, from 1687 onwards one 
Pierre Girardin. Girardin’s protestations to the Sultan would no doubt have caused 
Süleyman II and the grand vezir considerable irritation and perhaps embarrassment in 
relation to a European partner whose community members were supposed to be 
protected under treaties. The mention of Boyacıoğlu’s involvement (or suggested 
involvement) with the lady of Saint-Amand may have served to discredit and 
undermine him further, by questioning the moral fibre of a man who would dishonour 
his hosts in such a manner. Alternatively, it may simply have been a romantic 
involvement disapproved of by the Saint-Amand family and discouraged in support of 
their interests. It must be assumed that, despite the generally good treatment of French 
merchants
80, Boyacıoğlu reached the point of no return in his harassment of Marin, 
which was seen as an affront to the whole community and a violation of existing 
treaties between the two nations. 
What Boyacıoğlu’s example and the response of the Porte imply is that a regional 
official in a province such as Cyprus could potentially interpret his remit liberallyy, as 
long as a semblance of legality and stability was maintained. Power struggles and the 
subsequent concentration of power and redistribution of sultanic authority did not 
necessarily prompt an urgent response from the centre. Despite Boyacıoğlu’s 
stranglehold on power in Cyprus, the Porte did not seem to mind very much, as long 
as there was a degree of order and the taxes were paid. One may suspect that the first 
attempt at suppressing him was nothing more than a slap on the wrist, in the hope that 
strong censure and the presence of an official with considerably more authority 
(Çolak Mehmed Paşa) would be enough to restore order. It is unlikely that Çolak 
Mehmed Paşa arrived at the island with a large number of troops, since he was 
overpowered by Boyacıoğlu and his supporters. His mission was simply to bring 
Boyacıoğlu to order and ensure there was no possibility for further disturbance. The 
Porte and Çolak Mehmed Paşa possibly underestimated the extent of Boyacıoğlu’s 
power and support. 
 
Rebellion, revolt, şakavet, fitne or something else? 
 
What this analysis has shown is that whatever Boyacıoğlu did it was neither rebellion 
nor revolt, at least in an exclusive fashion. He did not raise the banner of rebellion 
against central authority. He clearly did not lead a peasant rebellion against their 
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landowners or tax collectors. He most certainly did not rebel in demand of his salary, 
nor did he lurk in the mountains robbing unsuspecting travellers of their wealth. What 
he did do was to test the boundaries of legality in order to reinforce his position as the 
main exponent of legitimacy and power on the island. Boyacıoğlu aimed to operate in 
the grey area located between the confines of the law and the relative freedom 
afforded by the distance between the province and Istanbul. This was a dangerous and 
delicate balancing act, one in which he succeeded for a number of years, but which 
ultimately led to his downfall. It is simply baffling that we are unable to define this 
phenomenon outside the limitations of anti-establishment or anti-authority 
terminology.  
Was this a breakdown of state control? Perhaps it was, but only after 1688, when 
imperial orders were ignored. But state control surely existed up to that point, albeit 
not in the manner the central authority – or idealistic historians – would have 
preferred. I doubt whether it is absolutely necessary to brand Boyacıoğlu with any 
label at all, other than that of the enthusiastic, if ultimately crushed, political 
funambulist. The terms used so far to describe this phenomenon are rather inadequate, 
and as such restrict understanding of the origins and various phases in Boyacıoğlu’s 
journey from ağa to şaki. This can only lead to disregard of the underlying long-term 
social and economic conditions which incubated the various Markoullises and 
Boyacıoğlus of Cypriot history. 
Boyacıoğlu’s (and Markoullis’s before him) rise to power shows that in late-
seventeenth-century members of the Cyprus elite found considerable space in which 
to develop their networks and interpret their roles in a flexible (and expansive) 
manner. This phenomenon, previously attributed to that milder expression of decline 
and decentralisation, was recently reviewed by historians in favour of a less negative 
approach. Piterberg suggests that decentralisation is “a nicer way of saying […] 
decline”81, where the state should ‘ideally’ be in complete control and all deviations 
from this model contribute to the decline.  
It is simply not enough to attribute social fermentation and tensions to the lack of 
state control. What happened in late-seventeenth-century Cyprus was not loss of 
control. It was a re-negotiation of the relationship between the centre and the 
periphery, where the incorporation of regional officials in the management of the 
provinces gathered momentum. This was also observed by Salzmann, who developed 
the idea of “centripetal decentralization”, whereby the state’s authority is not 
undermined by the process of decentralisation, but rather maintained through a series 
of “discrete but interlocking institutions in which the state’s coercive and 
administrative means were redeployed”.82 Within this framework, it is clear to see that 
the state negotiated with regional officials and groups in an attempt to integrate these 
and maintain control and fiscal efficiency. This did not necessarily mean the 
weakening of the state’s control, as the system could be efficient and functional 
without the state having to be omnipresent.  
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Fig. 1. Map of Cyprus of Boyacıoğlu’s flight in 1690 
 
